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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Judge Allphin was required to recuse

himself sua sponte after indicating that Dr.
Malovich had testified in his court previously
and stating that she was "a prominent and very
credible expert."
2. Vvhether the trial court was within its discretion
in awarding the parties joint legal custody of the
minor children, with Mother having final decision-making power, in awarding the parties joint
physical custody with Mother's home being designated as the primary residence of the minor
children, and in awarding Mother 230 nights of
parent time while awarding Father 135 nights.
3. Whether Mother is entitled to an award of attorney fees under Rule 24(k) for Father's failure to
follow the briefing requirements.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

As this appeal is from a district court judgment in a domestic relations case, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A4-103(2)(h).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue One: Whether Judge Allphin was required to recuse himself

sua sponte after indicating that Dr. Malovich had testified in his court
previously and stating that she was "a prominent and very credible expert."
Standard of Review. For the reasons explained in Part I.A of this brief, 1

this issue is unreviewable.
Issue Two: Whether the trial court was within its discretion in

awarding the parties joint legal custody of the minor children, with
Mother having final decision-making power, in awarding the parties joint
physical custody with Mother's home being designated as the primary
residence of the minor children, and in awarding Mother 230 nights of
parent time while awarding Father 135 nights.
Standard of Review. In making child custody awards, the trial court is

given broad discretion and its decisions will not be overturned absent an

1.

See infra at 20-22.
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abuse of discretion or manifest injustice. 2 If the trial court bases its decision on the legal standards set by the appellate courts and sets forth appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court's findings
of fact, including its ultimate finding that a custody arrangement is in the
best interests of the children, is reviewed for clear error. 3
Issue Three: Whether Mother is entitled to an award of attorney

fees under Rule 24(k) for Father's failure to follow the briefing requirements.
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

There is no statutory provision whose interpretation is central to
this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant Jared William Fullmer ("Father") and Appellee Kelli Ann
Fullmer ("Mother") were married in July of 2003. 4 Two children were born
in the course of the marriage: R.D.F. ("Son"), who was born in December
of 2003; and J .A.F. ("Daughter"), who was born in November of 2005. 5 Fa-

2.
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 87 (Utah App. 1989); see Tucher
v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209, 1214 (Utah 1996) ("Only where the trial court's
judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse of discretion will an appellate court interpose its own judgment.").
3.

See infra Part II, at 28-30.

4.

R. at 3.

5.

R. at 5.
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ther filed a petition for divorce on September 30, 2010. 6 Mother filed a
counterpetition for divorce on October 8, 2010 .7
On October 25, 2010, per Commissioner Catherine Conklin's recommendation, the trial court entered temporary orders awarding Father
temporary possession of the marital apartment and designating him as
the primary custodial parent. Mother was awarded liberal parent time
consisting of two of every three weekends from Friday, after school, to
Monday, prior to school, along with midweek overnights and shared holidays.8
In February of 2011, upon the stipulation of the parties, 9 the trial
court ordered Dr . Natalie Malovich to conduct a custody evaluation. 10 Dr.
Malovich completed her evaluation in July of 2011, and a Custody
Evaluation Settlement Conference was held on August 30, 201 1.11 At the
conference, Dr. Malovich recommended joint legal and physical custody,
with Mother as the primary custodial parent.12 She further recommended
that, during the school year, Father should be awarded liberal parent
time consisting of every other weekend from Friday, after school, to Mon-

6.

R. at 3.

7.

R. at 27.

8.

R. at 126-28.

9.

R. at 111-14.

10.

R. at 120-22 .

11.

R. at 178.

12.

R. at 336-37 .
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day, prior to school, along with midweek overnights on Thursdays the
week after Father's weekend and on Mondays the week before Father's
weekend. 13 She recommended the parties share holidays per the statute,
and that Father be awarded "a number of' non-holiday days off school. 14
The parties should each be awarded an equal amount of the summer
break. 15 Father rejected this recommendation, and the parties failed to
reach an agreement on custody and parent time at the settlement conference.16 The parties therefore began to prepare for trial. 17
A bench trial on the issues of custody of the children, the children's
primary residence, parent time, and child support was held on September
19-21, 2012 before Judge Michael G. Allphin. 18 After the trial was con-

cluded, Judge Allphin made oral findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
final orders on the record on September 25 , 2012, 19 which were later memorialized in the district court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law 20 and Decree of Divorce, 21 both entered on December 20, 2012. In the

13.

R. at 337.

14.

R. at 337.

15.

R. at 338.

16.

R. at 187 .

17.

R. at 198, 222-27.

18. R. at 870-872. For ease of refere nce, the trial transcripts of September 19th (R. at 870), Septe mber 20th (R. at 871), and September 21st (R. at
872) will be referred to as Tr .I , Tr.2, and Tr.3, respectively.
19.

R. at 868 (hereinafter "Ruling").

20.

R. at 780.
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Decree, the court ordered joint legal and physical custody, with Mother as
the primary custodial parent. Father was awarded liberal parent time
consisting of every other weekend from Friday, after school, to Monday,
prior to school, along with midweek overnights on Wednesdays during the
school year, with the parties sharing holidays per the statute and splitting days off school equally. The parties were awarded an equal amount of
the summer break. 22
Father filed a Notice of Appeal on January 17, 2013. 23
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
I.

JUDGE'S REMARKS ALLEGEDLY CONSTITUTING BIAS

Before trial, Father filed a motion in limine to exclude Dr.
Malovich's report and to prevent her from testifying at trial, or in the alternative, to prevent her from testifying as to her concerns about Father's
use of prescription pain medication. 24, As grounds for this motion, Father
argued, inter alia, that because there had never been a finding that he
had "ever had substance abuse issues, ... further investigation or opinion

21.

R. at 811.

22.

R. at 814-19.

23. R. at 830. While Father later filed an Amended Notice of Appeal outside of the deadline for filing an appeal, R. at 835, its only purpose was to
correct an error in the certificate of service and so does not call into question
this Court's jurisdiction under Utah R. App. P. 4(a).
24.

R. at 302 & 317; Ruling 6:5-16.
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on [his prescription drug use] is irrelevant." 25 In his memorandum in support, Father alleged that even though he gave her a signed release form,
Dr. Malovich nonetheless committed two third-degree felonies by obtaining his records from the Controlled Substance Database and by releasing
those records to both parties' counsel in response to a subpoena from Father's counsel. 2G
Judge Allphin denied this motion at the beginning of trial, stating
as follows:
You filed some interesting motions lately-sending me copies of
things that you don't want me to consider ... ; arguing about reports that are not generally admitted into evidence anyway; taking
swipes at a prominent and very credible expert; making argument
that assumes that the Court is either too stupid or lacks experience
in t hese types of matters. I've been on the bench 23 years, hearing
these kinds of cases. I know what I'm doing and I know what the
most important things are in these cases. I guess it's up to you to
determine whether or not you thinh I'm stupid, but based on what I
read in your memoranda, ... it appears that this drug issue that
you've been so involved in is an extremely small part of Dr.
Malovich's factual basis fo r her conclusion an d for h er recommendation .. . . I don't accept the petitioner's premise here that Dr.
Malovich should be precluded from testifying to what she found.
It's legitimate .. .. Petitioner and his witnesses can tell me, all day
long, that regular controlled substance use ... [doesn't] affect the
way a person approaches life, relationships, parenting, jobs, etc. I

25.

R. at 307-08.

26. R. at 313-16; see Letter of April 19, 2012, infra at A-1. Because Father does not challenge the trial court's denial of his motion to exclude, this
letter establishes a background fact that is not strictly material to the questions on appeal. Therefore, Mother has not moved to have it ente red into the
appellate record but provides it for the Court's convenience only.

DAY SHELL & LILJENQU IST,
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

L.C .

6

Mar. 21, 2014
Case no. 20130060-CA

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

have twenty-three years of experience that tell me otherwise .... I
certainly don't accept the basic premise that drug use of any kind,
whether it's legitimate prescribed pain killers, don't have any affect on what we're doing here because I think they probably do . ...
The exten t and whether or not it affects his ability to parent, that's
what we're here to make a determination on. They may very well
not, but are they important? Yes. Is it important that she brings
that to the Court's attention? I think absolutely. 27

II.

FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT

After hearing the evidence at trial, the Court made the following
findings of fact with respect to his determination of legal and physical
custody, the primary residence of the children, and parent time:
Parental Income and Work History. At the time of their marriage in

2003, the parties were both working at Convergys. 28 Mother gave birth to
Son shortly after they were married and stopped working at the end of
2003. 29 Father worked very little in 2004, and only made about $7,500
that year. 30 Because this was not enough to support their family , Mother
went back to work in late 2004. 31 While Father argued that her motivation in working was to get additional spending money for herself, the trial
court rejected this argument and found that Mother had to go back to

27.

Tr.1 6:21-8:18 (emphasis added).

28.

Ruling 10:6-14.

29.

Ruling 10:23-11:2.

30. Ruling 11:2-5.
31.

Ruling 11:18-20.
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work to support the family because Father was not doing his part. 32
Mother has worked full time from 2005 to the time of trial. 33
Meanwhile, Father worked very little in 2005 and did not work at
all in 2006. 34 While Father characterized this as being a stay -at-home dad
and argued that it would cost more to pay for day care for the children
than he could make in a minimum-wage job, 35 the trial court found that
this was not a mutual decision by the parties; rather, because Father refused to work, Mother agreed that he should babysit the children rather
than having her pay for daycare out of her salary. 36 Although Father
stayed at home with the children, he rarely did more than tend them
while Mother was at work- Mother made arrangements for the children's
breakfast before she left for work, came home at lunch time to see that
they were fed, and took care of their baths and other needs after work. 37
Father stayed up late playing a lot of video games and slept late into the
morning.38
In 2007, the parties separated, and Mother told Father she was no
longer willing to put up with a situation where she was the sole provider.

32.

Ruling 11:6-20.

33.

Ruling 13:2- 6, 14:2-3 & 8, 15:6- 7 & 24--25.

34.

Ruling 11:21-12:2, 13:1- 2.

35.

Tr.I 35:13-36:13.

36.

Ruling 12:3-11.

37.

Ruling 12:12-20, 13:8-13.

38.

Ruling 12:21-25, 13:14-19.
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Father began to work, and they reconciled. 39 However, in 2008, Father
again decided that he did not want to work any longer, and so babysat the
children while gaming and pursuing other interests. 40 Mother put the
children in afternoon preschool and kindergarten because she was concerned that Father would not be awake in time to get them ready for
school. 41
Father did not work again until sometime during 2009, when he
started a smoking-cessation business with some business partners he met
through an online multiplayer video game:12 Father worked on this business from home for about 5 to 20 hours per week, and did not take a wage
or draw before the parties separated. 43 After the parties separated, Father decided that he needed an income, and so he and his partners agreed
that in excha nge for him storing the product and other business necessaries at his home , he would be paid $1,405.00 per month. 44 This arrangement was ongoing to the time of trial. 45

39.

Ruling 13:20-14:1.

40.

Ruling 14:8- 14, 14:24-15:4.

41.

Ruling 14:15-23; Tr.1 105:-106:3.

42.

Ruling 7:17-19, 31:3-6 .

43.

Ruling 15: 18-23.

44.

Ruling 7:13-16, 7:23-8:16, 16:20-17:9.

45.

R. at 801 (~ 47).
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Parental Residences. When the parties filed for divorce, they were

residing in a two-bedroom apartment that they rented in Bountiful. 4G After the October 2010 temporary orders hearing, Mother moved out of the
marital apartment and into a three-bedroom apartment in the lower floor
of her parents' home in Taylorsville. 47 The apartment occupies the entire
lower floor of the home and has its own private amenities. 48 Mother pays
rent to her parents for the apartment. 49 The children each have their own
room and the apartment is appropriately furnished and decorated for the
children. 50 There is a large yard on the property, with play equipment and
a trampoline. 51 Several of Mother's relatives live in close proximity, allowing the children easy access to cousins and others to play with on a frequent basis. 52
Meanwhile, Father continued to reside in the two-bedroom apartment with the children after the temporary orders hearing. 53 The children
shared one room and Father slept on the couch so that he could use the

46.

Ruling 9:11-15.

47.

R. at 783-84

48.

Ruling 9:15-18; Tr.2 208:10-23.

49.

Tr.2 209:16-18.

50.

Ruling 9:18- 23.

51.

Ruling 9:23-25.

52.

Ruling 10:1-5.

53.

Ruling 7:6-11.
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master bedroom for storing business supplies. 54 After Dr. Malovich criticized his living arrangements, Father's mother bought him a threebedroom home and gave him $13,000 in order to appropriately furnish
and decorate it for the children. 55 The home is in a nice neighborhood, has
a nice yard, and is within walking distance to the children's school. 56 Father has no financial obligations to make mortgage payments or to pay
rent to his mother on the home .57
The trial court next examined the factors of Rule 4-903 of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration: 58
Less Important Factors. The trial court found that the following fac-

tors named in Rule 4-903 were either of limited relevance under the circumstances of the case or did not substantially favor one parent over the
other, and so were not given much weight in its final determination: the
children's preferences; 59 the benefit of keeping siblings together; 60 the

54.

Ruling 7:11-16.

55.

Ruling 8:17-24.

56.

Ruling 8:25-9:5.

57.

Ruling 9:6-10.

58. ·while the requirement to consider the 4-903 factors only applies to
custody evaluators, see, e.g. , Williams v. Williams, 2001 UT App 330U (no.
20000013, Nov. 8, 2001), these factors include all the factors that trial
courts are r equired to consider under Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-10 & -10.2.

(ii 32.a).

59.

R. at 790

60.

R. at 790 (~ 32.b).
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relative strength of the children's bond with each parent; 61 reasons for
having relinquished custody in the past; 62 religious compatibility with the
children; 63 kinship; 64 and evidence of abuse. 65
Interest in Continuing Previous Custody Arrangements. The trial

court found that the children are doing well and functioning adequately in
their custodial arrangement under the temporary order. 66 The court disagreed with Dr. Malovich's concern regarding the children's grooming
while with their father, and found that the children did not appear to be
generally unkempt, poorly groomed, or wearing ill-fitting clothes as a
regular occurrence while in their father's care. 67 However, the court also
found that the current amount of contact that the parties' youngest
daughter has with Mother is not adequate for her needs. 68 Further, the
court rejected the argument of Father's expert witness that the court
should not interfere with a custody arrangement if it was working as contrary to the responsibility of the court to act in the best interests of the

61.

R. at 790 (~ 32 .c).

62.

R. at 792 (if 32.e.v).

63.

R. at 792-93 (ii 32.e.vi).

64.

R. at 793

65.

R. at 794 (i[ 32.e.ix).

66.

Ruling 26:7-12.

67.

Ruling 26:25-27:12.

68.

Ruling 26:12-14.
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children-While the interest in stability is weighty, the court would not
grant it determinative effect. 6D
Capacity to Function as Parents. The trial court found that Father

genuinely cares about the children, that he displays a strong motivation
to be actively involved in their lives, and that he has made some major
changes in his life from what he was doing 3-5 years ago to what was doing at the time of trial. 70 After the parties' separation, Father has had
more involvement with the children and started to play a significant role
in their lives, becoming a primary caretaker for the children. 71 While the
court found Father's efforts to develop his business commendable, it also
found that his focus on remaining self-employed appeared to take precedence over meeting his family's more immediate needs. 72 The court found
that Mother genuinely loves the children and has consistently displayed a
long-term commitment to their care and well-being even after the parties'
separation and temporary order did not allow her to be as involved in the
children's lives as she was during the marriage. 73 The Court expressed no
concerns regarding Mother's parenting style or ability to care for the children.74
69.

Ruling 35:11-19.

70.

Ruling 21:2-10.

71.

Ruling 17:5-9.

72.

Ruling 21:11- 17.

73.

Ruling 22:23-23:5.

74. Ruling 23:18-21.
Mar. 21, 201 4
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Moral Character and Emotional Stability. The trial court found that

both parents possess the moral character and judgment necessary to
model appropriate behavior and instill moral values in their children. 75
However, the court noted that Father struggled emotionally at the beginning of the parties' separation and unnecessarily involved the children in
his emotional distress, as well as inappropriately blaming Mother for the
divorce in front of the children, which ca used some distress in the children's lives. 76 The Court found no concerns about Ms. Fullmer's emotional
stability. 77
Duration and Depth of Desire for Custody. The trial court found that

both parties have had a long-standing commitment to be involved in the
children's lives for the last two years since the parties separated.78 However, Father did not demonstrate a real depth and desire to be fully involved in the children's lives for the years prior to the parties' separation.79
Personal vs. Surrogate Care. The trial court found that Father is

not employed outside the home and is able to care for the children on a
full-time basis with minimum need for surrogate care. 80 As Mother is em75.

Ruling 27:17-20.

76.

Ruling 27:21- 28:3.

77.

Ruling 28:4-6 .

78.

Ruling 28:8-12, 20-23.

79.

Ruling 28:12-20.

80.

Ruling 28:25-29:3.
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ployed full time outside the home and maintains a traditional work
schedule, she would require the use of surrogate care after school hours. 81
Substance Abuse Concerns. The trial court found that there was

not sufficient evidence to conclude that Father's use of prescription medications in the last two years since the parties separation has impaired his
parenting, endangered the parties' children, or progressed to the point of
addiction or moving on to harder drugs. 82 There was evidence that he took
high quantities of controlled substances for pain prior to the parties' separation that may have contributed to his general lack of interest in caring
for the children during the marriage. 83
Financial Condition. The trial court noted its concerns about Fa-

ther's financial stability. 84 There was no evidence presented at trial as to
the revenues or value of the business, the partnership agreement or fi.
nancial arrangements between t he partners, the nature of Father's responsibilities with regard to the business, or the identity of Father's business partners. 85 Due to the lack of evidence presented about the business's financial condition, the court expressed a lack of confidence that

81.

Ruling 29:3- 6.

82.

Ruling 29:13-30:8.

83.

Ruling 30:9-12.

84.

Ruling 31:3-17.

85.

Ruling 7:17-22, 15:12-18, 21:18-22:4, 31: 16-21.
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Father could continue to take the $1 ,400 per month draw from the business.86 The court expressed no concerns over Mother's financial stability. 87
Ability to Support Relationship with the Other Parent. The trial court

found that the parties' two minor children would benefit from an ongoing
positive relationship with both their mother and their father, including
regular and predictable parent time with both of them. 88 The court further found that it is extremely important for the children's self-worth and
emotional health for each parent to support the children's relationship
with the other parent, to encourage the children to love and respect the
other parent, to build up the other parent in the minds of the children. 89
The court further found concerns with Father's ability to play a
positive supporting role in the children's relationship with Mother. 90 In
addition to his past issues of blaming her for the divorce in front of the
children, Father's position with respect to Mother's parent time was inconsistent: on one hand, Father testified that he wants the children to be
able to see Mother as much as possible, but on the other, he believed that
the interim parent-time schedule was too disruptive and maintained that
minim um parent time was in the best interest of the children. 91 The court
86.

Ruling 31:23-32:3.

87.

Ruling 32:4-10.

88.

Ruling 17:22-18:6.

89.

Ruling 18:7-19: 12.

90.

Ruling 32: 17-25.

91.

Ruling 33:1-16.
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found that Mother demonstrated a good ability to be supportive of the
children's relationship with Father despite their personal differences and
appeared to support them in special events that occur during Father's
parent time.92
Best Interests of the Children. After making the above findings , the

trial court determined that it was in the children's best interest to move
their primary residence from Father's home to Mot her's home .93 The court
acknowledged that this change would lead to some disruption of the children's schooling, activities, and domestic situation, 94 but found that the
negative effects of that disruption would be mitigated by the children's
young age , the fact that Mother's home is appropriate for the children,
she has family members and friends and other appropriate contacts for
the children to have , and the school in her area appears appropriate. 95
Additionally, the court found that the effects of the disruption were outweighed, as Mother has been the most positive and primary influence in
the children's lives, the children desire to have more contact with her, she
has been the most responsible parent and the financial provider for the
household, and she had the ability to provide a loving, nurturing home for

92.

Ruling 23:6-9.

93.

Ruling 35:20-23.

94.

Ruling 33:25-34:5.

95.

Ruling 35:1-10.
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the children where it was more certain that the relationship with Father
would be supported and fostered as well. 96

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In his brief, Father asks the Court to reverse the trial court's custody and parent-time determination based on the following arguments:
First, Father argues that Judge Allphin was biased in favor of Dr.
Malovich, the custody evaluator, and so gave her opinion undue weight.
However, because Father failed to file a motion to disqualify at the trial
court level at any time, this issue is not reviewable. Also, even if the
plain-error doctrine did apply, Father did not show any of the required
elements of plain error in his brief. Second, Father argues that the trial
court's custody and parent-time determination was an abuse of discretion.
However, Father fails to marshal the evidence in favor of the decision,
and fails to develop a coherent analysis of the findings that would show
why the ultimate finding of custody and parent time is unsupportable, he
fails to meet his burden. Because Father has failed to meet his burden
and failed to properly brief the issues he raises, this Court should affirm
and award :Mother her attorney fees for the necessity of defending against
this appeal.

96.

Ruling 34:5-25, 35:11-19.
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ARGUMENT

I.

THERE ARE NO GROUNDS TO REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT ON
THE BASIS THAT JUDGE ALLPHIN FAILED TO RECUSE HIMSELF SUA SPONTE.

Father's first claim of error is that Judge Allphin exhibited disqualifying bias and should have recused himself. While Father admits that he
made no objection at trial and the record shows that he did not file a motion to disqualify under Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Father nonetheless argues that the Court should apply the plain error doctrine to review the issue. However, as explained in Part I.A, Utah appellate courts have consistently held that filing a motion and affidavit under
Rule 63(b) is a prerequisite to appellate review, meaning Father's assignment of error is not reviewable.
Moreover, Father's claim that Judge Allphin's failure to recuse himself sua, sponte was plain error fails on its merits. A party arguing plain
error bears the burden of demonstrating that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence
in the verdict is undermined." 97 As explained below in Parts I.B through
I.D, Father fails to prove that there is error, that any error would be
plain, or that any error would have been harmful. Because Father fails to

97.

Spafford v. Granite Credit Union , 2011 UT App 401,

~

42, 266 P.3d

866.
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show even one of these elements, the Court should reject his argument for
reversal on grounds of bias.
A.

Father's claim of bias is unreviewable because filing a motion and
affidavit under Rule 63(b) is a necessary prerequisite to appellate
review.

Father argues that the Court should review his claim that the trial
judge should have disqualified himself despite his failure to file a motion
and affidavit under Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
only excuse he offers for his failure to do so is that "the bias did not show
itself until after trial began." 98 However, this Court has previously held in
its decision of In re Estate of Valarce 99 that failure to file an affidavit under Rule 63(b) precludes appellate review of a disqualification claim. In

Valaree, the appellant attempted to raise for the first time on appeal the
issue of whether the trial judge should have recused himself from the case
because he had worked for the same firm where [a key witness] was a
partner." 100 The appellant acknowledged that he had not filed a motion
and affidavit under Rule 63(b) below, but argued that the Court "should
consider this issue because he was unaware of the trial judge's alleged
employment at Thorne's law firm until after his appeal was filed." 101 The
Court rejected the appellant's argument and held that a party is not ex98. Br. Father 36.
99.

In re Estate of Valaree, 2013 UT App 95, 301 P.3d 1031.

ii 38.
101. Id. at ii 40.

100. Id. at
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cused from compliance with Rule 63(b) even if it does not discover facts
sufficient to show bias, prejudice or conflict of interest until after the
judgment is entered. Rather,
when a party discovers facts supporting the disqualification of the
trial judge after judgment is entered, the proper procedure is to file
a motion for relief from judgment, similar to the relief available
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). By pursuing relief from
judgment in the trial court, factual issues raised by Appellant can
be explored and resolved, including the basis of Appellant's allegations , the time when Appellant knew or should have known of the
information, and the trial judge's involvement with Thorne's law
firm. Based on that factual record, the trial court can then determine whether the participation of the trial judge warrants a new
trial. Furthermore, the rule 60(b) hearing and decision will create
a factual record for appellate review .... Unlike a trial court, we
do not find facts, and our review is limited to the factual record developed in the trial court. Therefore, we decline to consider Appellant's claim that the trial judge should have recused himself from
serving in this matter.102

Like the appellant in Valcarce, Father did not file a motion or affidavit under Rule 63(b) at any time before judgment, despite the fact that
they learned of Judge Allphin's alleged bias on September 19, 2012 and a
final judgment was not entered until three months later on December 20,
2012. Nor did father file a motion to disqualify and affidavit along with a

102. Id. at ilif 42-43; see also Straley v. Halliday , 2000 UT 38, ii 9, 997
P.2d 338 (holding that "a party alleging judicial bias or prejudice must first
file an affidavit to that effect in the trial court," and that failure to do so
precludes appeal of the issue); Melvin v. Baher, 2007 UT App 234U at 3-4
(no . 20060643, July 6, 2007) (holding that appellant's "failure to timely file a
motion to disqualify is fatal to his claim on appeal" notwithstanding his
claim of plain error).
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motion to set aside at any time in the fifteen months since judgment was
entered, even though Father raised this as an issue in his docketing
statement of February 7, 2013. Father has squandered every opportunity
to ask the trial court to develop a factual record on this issue, and t his
Court should decline to take up the issue for the first time on appeal.
B.

Judge Al/phin's failure to recuse himself was not error.

Utah law requires a judge «to disqualify himself or herself in any
proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned."103 Whether a judge's impartiality may reasonably be questioned
is determined by viewing the question through the eyes of "a reasonable
person, knowing all the circumstances." 104 This test requires putting isolated remarks in their proper context before determining whether they
evince bias. 105
In his brief, Father attempts to characterize Judge Allphin's remarks at the beginning of trial as defending Dr. Malovich's credibility and
demonstrating bias against any attempt to question that credibility. In so
doing, Father completely decontextualizes the comments. As explained in
Part I of the Statement of Facts, supra, Judge Allphin was addressing Fa-

103. Utah Code Jud. Conduct 2.11.
104. West Jordan City v. Goodman , 2006 UT 27, if 22, 135 P.3d 874.
105. See Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sau. & Loan Assn., 767 P.2d 538, 547
(Utah 1988) (explaining that, when viewed in context, a trial judge's remark
t hat he had "cus sed financial institutions" was "simply a statement about
an attitude he had had many years earlier" and not indicative of bias).
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ther's motion in limine to exclude her. In this context, it is clear that
Judge Allphin's statement about "taking swipes at a prominent and very
credible expert" refers not to Father's "motion to exclude [Dr. Malovich's]
report" 10G itself, but rather the accusation within that motion that she had
committed two third-degree felonies. Likewise, it is clear that Judge Allphin's statement that "I guess it's up to you to determine whether or not
you think I'm stupid" refers not to Father's "retaining an expert to contradict [Dr.] Malovich," 107 but rather Father's argument "that regular controlled substance use ... [doesn't] affect the way a person approaches life,
relationships, parenting, jobs, etc." 108 While this language may have been
somewhat harsh, a fact that Judge Allphin acknowledged at the end of
trial, 109 "mere expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and
even anger, are insufficient to establish the existence of bias or partiality."110
Moreover, the standard for disqualification based on a judge's comments is very high:
Any judicial comment or ruling gives the appearance of partiality
in the broadest sense to the adversely affected party. Suppose a
judge who is the trier of fact comments during a hearing that a
106. Br. Father 2 (if 2).
107. Br. Father 2

Ci[ 3).

108. Tr.l 8:1-5.
109. Tr.3 233:7-25.
110. Campbell, Maach & Sessions v. Debry, 2001 UT App 397,
P.3d 984.
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parent has had the opportunity to improve himself in order to
make a home for his child but has made no effort to do so. Can the
judge be disqualified for bias and prejudice? Whenever a judge
hears any evidence, he develops an attitude which may change as
the evidence develops. As long as the judge decides the case only
after all the evidence is submitted, there appears to be no harm in
such a comment. Such judicial comments made before a jury would
constitute an improper expression of opinion on the evidence, but
those statements made out of their hearing do not require
recusal. 111

The two cases from Florida that Father references actually illustrate the two circumstances in which a comment can lead to disqualification. In Barnett v. Barnett, the judge's comment made before closing arguments that a party "should attempt to negotiate for more visitation
than she would otherwise receive if the trial court made the decision" 112
strongly suggested that the court had made its final decision before the
submission of evidence. In Whitaher v. State, the judge's comment was before a criminal jury and so constituted an improper comment. 113
However, in this case, there was no indication that the trial court
had decided any of the issues presented-in fact , immediately after the
statements in question, Judge Allphin stated that he did not "come to this

111. Madsen, 767 P.2d at 546 (quoting Leslie W. Abramson, Judicial Disqualification nnder Canon 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct 23 (1986)).
112. Barnett v. Barnett, 727 So. 2d 311, 311 (Fla. App. 1999).
113. Whitaher v. State, 742 So.2d 530, 530 (Fla. App. 1999). As a side
note, Mother observes that the Whitalier court does not give the facts behind
the motion to recuse, nor indicate whether it involved the judge's comments
about the officer.
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case with any preconceived ideas about what the outcome may be," 114 and
that while he respected Dr. Malovich's expertise, he did not always agree
with her conclusions: "I believe she works hard at providing honest information that will assist the Court . ... [S]ometimes, it's information that I
find very helpful, and other times, I have a different opinion than she
does after I've heard all the evidence." 115 Moreover, even if it may have
been an improper comment on an expert's credibility had a jury been present, this was a bench trial.

It could be argued that it was not clear from the record exactly what
Judge Allphin was referring to in his remarks or that Judge Allphin's
statements of impartiality should not be taken at face value. However,
because these arguments require determinations of credibility and making factual findings , the place to make these arguments was in a motion
brought under Rule 63(b), so that an adequate record could be made for
appellate review. As it was Father's job to make sure that record was
made, any deficiency in that record must be construed against finding
bias.
Finally, the fact that Judge Allphin had heard from Dr. Malovich in
previous cases and respected her expertise does not constitute grounds for
disqualification. The Utah Supreme Court previously noted that

114. Tr.I 8:19-24.
115. Tr.I 9:8-18.

l.C.
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although litigants are entitled to a judge who will hear both sides
and decide an issue on the merits of the law and the evidence presented, they are not entitled to a judge whose mind is a clean slate.
Each judge brings to the bench the experiences of life, both personal and professional. A lifetime of experiences that have generated a number of general attitudes cannot be left in chambers
when a judge takes the bench.116

Judge Allphin has been a district court judge for 17 years, and was a domestic relations commissioner for six years before that. 117 Given that
amount of time, one can expect that he has heard from certain custody
evaluators multiple times and has developed opinions about their work.
In fact, it would be disconcerting if he did not. So long as there is no evidence of "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair
judgment impossible," 118 there is no basis for recusal based on having
previously heard from an expert witness.
C. As there is no settled law in Utah with respect to recusal based
on judicial comments, any error was not plain.

Second, even if there were error, it was not plain. "Utah courts have
repeatedly held that a trial court's error is not plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court." 119 Father admits in his brief
that "Utah cases applying [Rule 2.11] do not analyze bias based on a

116. Madsen, 767 P.2d at 546.
117. Tr.3 230:22-231:1.

if 25.
2011 UT App 401 at if 42 .

118. Debry, 2001 UT App 397 at
119. Spafford,
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judge's comments." 120 Mother concurs that in researching the issue, she
has not become aware of any case where a Utah appellate court has decided that a judge's comments gave rise to a reasonable question of his or
her impartiality. Without settled appellate law on the issue, any error
could not be plain under Utah law. Therefore, Father's claim of plain error fails.
D.

Any error was not harmfui, as there is no indication that another
judge hearing the same evidence likely would have made findings
that would have materially altered the result in Father's favor.

An error is harmful only if, by the end of considering the effect of
the error, the Court determines that the "likelihood of a different outcome
[is] sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict." 121 In his
brief, Father does not point to any specific element of the trial court's decision that was likely to have come out differently had the judge recused
himself. Instead, he simply asserts: "It is clear the judge's bias may well
have had an impact on the final outcome." 122 This is a one-sentence assertion provided in lieu of an argument, which is not adequate to show harmful error and not in compliance with the appellate briefing rules. 123 Fur-

120. Br. Father 37.
121. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 832, 840 (Utah 1992).
122. Br. Father 39.
123. See Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Graham, 2008 UT App 207,
~ 17 n.5 , 186 P.3d 1012 (noting that an argument consisting of a onesentence assertion that an action on the part of the other side was improper
did "not comply with appellate briefing rules").
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ther, as shown below, Father fails to properly marshal the evidence,
which would be a prerequisite to showing that the trial court's findings
were close questions, and that another judge hearing the same evidence
likely would have made findings that would have materially altered the
result in Father's favor. Finally, as shown below in Part II.B, the decisions that Father ascribes to bias are supported by a great deal of evidence. Father fails to make his case for harmful error, and his claim of
disqualifying bias must be rejected.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF CUSTODY AND PARENT TIME WAS WELL
WITHIN ITS BROAD DISCRETION; A NEW TRIAL IS NOT WARRANTED.

In making child custody awards, the trial court is given broad discretion and its decisions will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice. 124 This discretion is limited by the following
threshold requirements: first , the trial court's discretion "must be exercised within the confines of the legal standards set by the appellate
courts." 125 Second, "to ensure the court acted within its broad discretion,
the facts and reasons for the court's decision must be set forth in appro-

124. Schindler, 776 P.2d at 87; see Tucher, 910 P.2d at 1214 ("Only where
the trial court's judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse of discretion will an appellate court interpose its own judgment.").
125. S chindler, 776 P .2d at 87; see Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 196
(Utah App. 1992) (explaining that the legal standards set by the appellate
courts are based on Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10, and noting that "there is no
checklist of custody factors, since these factors are highly personal and individual, and do not lend themselves to the means of generalization employed
in other areas of the law.").
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priate findings of fact and conclusions of law." 12G If these threshold requirements are met, the party challenging the court's determination of
custody bears the burden to prove that the court's ultimate finding that a
custody arrangement is in the best interests of the children is "so lacking
in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence." 127
While Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its
determination of custody and parent time, he does not claim that the trial
court failed to analyze the custody question within the standards set by
appellate courts, nor does he claim that the trial court's findings were insufficient. Therefore, Father bears the burden of showing that the trial
court's ultimate finding was in clear error. As Father fails to properly
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's ultimate and subsidiary findings and fails to develop a coherent analysis of the findings that
would show why the ultimate finding of custody and parent time is unsupportable, he fails to meet his burden. The Court should affirm the trial
court's award of custody and parent time.

126. Schindler, 776 P.2d at 87; see Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259
(Utah App. 1993) ("To ensure that the trial court's determination, discretionary as it is, is rationally based, it is essential that the court set forth in
its findings of fact not only that it finds one parent to be the better person to
care for the child, but also the basic facts which show why that ultimate
conclusion is justified.").
127. A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 1999 UT
App 87, if 26, 977 P.2d 518; see Cagatay v. Erturk, 2013 UT App 82, ii 3, 302
P .3d 137 (holding that a party's challenge to a trial court's award of joint
custody failed because the party "fail[ed] to demonstrate that the trial
court's findings were clearly erroneous .... ").
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A.

Father has failed to adequately marshal the evidence in support
of the finding that the custody arrangement is in the best interests
of the children or for in support of subsidiary findings.

In order to challenge a trial court's finding that a custody arrangement is in the best interests of the children, a party ''must first marshal
all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it
in a light most favorable to the court below ." 128 The marshaling process
contains three steps: first, the party must identify the ultimate factual
finding it wishes to challenge in the argument section of the brief. 129 Second, directly after identifying that finding, 130 the party "must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports" that ultimate finding , including evidence supporting subsidiary findings. 131 Finally, "after constructing this
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a

128. Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22,

,r25, 112 P.3d 495.

129. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (identifying marshaling requirement as
part of the argument section of the brief); Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P .2d
301, 304 (Utah App. 1987) (noting that a party failed to meet his burden to
marshal in part because "the requisite presentation of supporting evidence
is also not found in the argument portion of appellant's brief.") .
130. Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, ii 47 n.11 , 54 P.3d 1119 ("To comply
with the marshaling requirement, appellants must marshal all of the favorable evidence at the point at which they challenge the factual finding."); see
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App.
1991) ("What the City has not done is to correlate particular items of evidence with the challenged findings .... ").
131. Parduhn , 2005 UT 22 at
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fatal flaw in the evidence" which is "sufficient to convince the appellate
court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous."132
Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have pointed out on
numerous occasions that a "general catalogue of evidence" that presents
evidence favorable to both parties and does not "correlate particular items
of evidence with the challenged findings" does not satisfy the marshaling
burden. 133 Rather, "Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position." 134 \Vhile some attorneys have balked at this way of describing the marshaling burden, saying it compromises zealous advocacy, this formulation is another way of
saying that in order for a party to show that a finding is clearly erroneous, the party must first honestly and objectively represent the finding
rather than attacking a caricature or strawman finding. Avoiding strawmen and representing an opponent's argument objectively is just good argumentation, and the Court should insist on parties' compliance.
Utah appellate courts have insisted on strict compliance with the
marshaling requirement to promote the objectives of efficiency and fairness:
132. Majestic Inv. , 818 P.2d at 1315.
133. Majestic Inv ., 818 P.2d at 1315; see Roderich, 2002 UT 84 at ~ 47
n.11; A.K.& R. Whipple, 1999 UT App 87 at if 26; Fitzgerald, 7 44 P.2d at
304.
134. Majestic Inv. , 818 P .2d at 1315.
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Efficient resolution of disputes demands that, unless the facts
found by the trial court are clearly erroneous, they will be upheld
on appeal. ... Successful challenges to findings of fact thus must
demonstrate to appellate courts first how the trial court found the
facts from the evidence and second why such findings contradict
the weight of the evidence. These demonstrations in appellants'
briefs not only avoid retrying the facts but also assist us in our decision-making and opinion-writing, thus increasing our efficiency .... Additionally, the deference we afford to trial courts' factual findings is based on and fosters the principle that appellants
rather than appellees bear the greater burden on appeal. ... When
appellants challenge findings of fact, fairness requires that they
bear the costs of demonstrating how the trial court found those
facts from the evidence and why those findings contradict the
weight of the evidence. 135

If a party fails to fulfill the marshaling burden, the appellate court as-

sumes that the record supports the findings of the trial court and accepts
the findings as valid.13 G
In this case, while Father acknowledges his burden to marshal the
evidence, 137 his purported marshaling of the evidence is just a general
catalogue of evidence summarizing the testimony at trial. As this Court
stated in Majestic Investments when it rejected a similar catalogue of evidence: "The marshaling concept does not reflect a desire to merely have
pertinent excerpts from the record readily available to a reviewing

135. Oneida / SLIC u. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc. , 872 P.2d
1051, 1053-54 (Utah App. 1994).
136. Crochett v. Crochett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah App. 1992).
137. Br. Father 1.
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court." 138 Father fails to correlate evidence to particular findings that he
challenges, and fails to put it in the portion of the argument section of his
brief where he challenges the trial court's findings. In so doing, Father
fails to uphold his burden to show why the findings contradict the weight
of the evidence, shifting the burden of any weighing to this Court. The
Court should decline to become the "depository in which the appealing
party may dump the burden of argument and research" 139 and accept the
trial court's findings as valid.
B.

The trial courrs findings were not clearly erroneous 1 and the
courfs final determination of custody and parent time was not an
abuse of discretion.

But even if this Court were to overlook Father's failure to properly
marshal the evidence and exercise its discretion "to consider independently the whole record and determine if the decision below has adequate
factual support,"140 there is still no cause to conclude that the trial court
acted beyond his discretion in making the custody and parent-time determination. Father makes no attempt to analyze whether the trial
court's determination was abuse of discretion in any systematic way-it is
unclear whether Father is trying to argue that certain findings were
clearly erroneous or that the district court gave improper weight to certain factors . Rather, Father's argument appears to be a series of general138. Majestic Inv. , 818 P.2d at 1315.
139. Spafford, 2011 UT App 401 at

,r 25.

140. Martinez v. M edia-Paymaster Plus , 2007 UT 42,
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ized grievances with particular findings and an impermissible attempt to
reargue evidence. 141 As such, it is very difficult for Mother to do more
than generally argue in favor of the trial court's discretion. Mother asks
the Court to reject any attempts by Father to reform and redraft Point 2
of his Argument in his reply brief, as it would lead to a procedurally unfair situation. 142
Father's objections to the trial court's custody and parent-time determination seem to be as follows:
"

The court's award of parent time was exactly as proposed by Dr.
Malovich, which shows bias.

The trial court did not adopt Dr. Malovich's suggestion "exactly"rather, he rejected her plan to alternate midweek days between Monday
and Thursday. 143 The trial court indicates that its choice of schedule is
based on its agreement with Father's argument that "regardless of which
parent obtains primary custody, ... it would be in the children's best interest to have a more consistent schedule with fewer transitions."144
Moreover, it does not appear that there were a whole lot of other options
141. See Oneida, 872 P.2d at 1053 (rejecting an appellant's tactic of "reargu[ing] the case before this court") .
142. See Maak v. II-IC Health Servs. , 2007 UT App 244, if 30, 166 P.3d 631
(declining to address issues raised for the first time in a reply brief in order
"to prevent the resulting unfairness to the respondent if an argument or issue was first raised in the r eply brief and the respondent had no opportunity to respond").
143. Ruling 36:20-37:15.
144. Ruling 37:5-8.
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with respect to parent time. As Dr. Malovich explained, between the time
it would take for the non-custodial parent to drop off the children at their
school and Mother's traditional 8 to 5 job, there was not a whole lot of
flexibility with respect to the schedule during the school year. 145 Finally,
the only other proposal explicitly on the table was Father's proposal that
Mother get minimum standard time during the school year. 146 The trial
court's adoption of most of Dr. Malovich's parent-time recommendation
reflects not bias, but rather both the court and custody evaluator's recognition that this was the most workable schedule.
•

The court relied on Dr. Malovich 's finding that the amount of time that
the children spent with their mother was not adequate for Daughter's
needs, even though it was based on information that was out of date.

The court's finding that Daughter needed more time with Mother
was based on the report of Dr. Malovich, who last interviewed the children in August of 2011. Father states that "the glowing report of [Daughter]'s school teacher, [Ms.] Miller, of the scout leader [Ms. Kyes] and the
neighbor [Ms. Waite?] are all current information of [Daughter]'s adjustment to the custodial arrangement with their father." 147 Father does not
give any citation to the record as to these "glowing reports," but it does

145. Tr.3 142:16-143:8.
146. Tr.I 129:25-130:21.
147. Br. Father 41-42.
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not appear that any of these witnesses testified as to their opinions on the
question or any observations that they made on the subject. 148
Moreover, Dr. Malovich's conclusion that Daughter needed more
contact with Mother was based on her observation that Daughter "displays a sometimes emotionally needy style and some separation anxiety
in regard to [Mother] suggesting that the current amount of contact she
has with her is not adequate for her needs." 149 None of these witnesses
regularly witnessed Mother and Daughter interacting, and so could not
testify as to any dinginess daughter had toward Mother. Ms. Kyes was
Son's scout leader, and did not deal with Daughter except when she and
Father were there together with Son at pack events. Also, if the neighbor
Father refers to is Ms. Waites, she never testified about Daughter at all,
and any know ledge she had about the children would have been limited to
the time she had been Father's neighbor: October 2010 to September
2011-her information would be no more current than Dr. Malovich's information. In fact, if her "glowing report" was based on information from
the same timeframe that Dr. Malovich observed Daughter's emotionally
needy style, it discounts the conclusion that later "glowing reports" signify
a change in Daughter's emotional needs.

148. See Tr.I 218:12-225:24 (lVIs. Kyes); 244:2-250:4 (lVIs. v\Taite); 250:11275:23 (Ms. Miller).
149. Tr.I 134:1-7.
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Father cites no record evidence that would contradict Dr. Malovich's
conclusion that the children want to spend more time with their mother,
and Mother knows of none. Father also gives no reason to believe that
Daughter's needs had changed in the time between Dr. Malovich's report
and the time of trial. The custody evaluator and the trial court can only
work on the information that they have. If a party believes that information does not take into account some significant changes, it is that party's
responsibility to present that evidence to the court and/or custody evaluator. General "glowing reports" during and after the time of the custody
evaluation is not enough for this Court to conclude that the district court's
finding that Daughter's need for more time with Mother persisted from
the time of the custody evaluation to the present.
•

The court improperly found concerns with Father's ability to support
the children's relationship with Mother.

Father objects to this because Father's act of blaming Mother for
the divorce "was conduct that occurred in 2010, at least two years prior to
trial." 150 The trial court found that Father inappropriately blamed Mother
for the divorce in front of the children. Father acknowledged
talking to the children about the fact that he didn't want the divorce, that this was their mom's choice. He seemed to feel that that
would be a more honest response than to share responsibility for
the separation or divorce in talking with the children. So, he was
quite open about the fact that he had been open with the children
about that issue, that he did not take responsibility for the divorce
150. Br. Father 42.
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with the children and, clearly, indicated to them that it was their
mom's choice. 151

However, rather than being an isolated incident, Dr. Malovich
viewed this incident as part of a larger concern that Father "displays little
insight into how his communication has impacted the children's responses
and feelings regarding their mother, as well as added to their emotional
distress." 152 Dr. Malovich describes more incidents that validate that concern in her testimony, including the river-rafting event. 153 The trial court
also indicated that its concerns were boosted by his proposed parent-time
schedule, which would have cut quite a bit of Mother's parent time from
the temporary order. 154 While Father indicated that he would be flexible
to provide Mother with more parent time in addition, Dr. Malovich noted
that "if a parent isn't willing to commit to that time ... in some sort of
more structured way, trying to leave extra time as something that the
parties negotiate," it is cause for concern. 155 In short, the trial court was
right to have concerns about Father's ability to support Mother's relationship with the children.

151. Tr.3 91:6-15.
152. Tr.3 99:7-11.
153. See Tr.3 98:25-103:3.
154. Ruling 32:16-33:16.
155. Tr.3 123:18-124:4.
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•

The court improperly found that during the marriage, Father merely
"babysat" the children and did not display a real depth of desire to be
involved in the children's fives.

Father objects to the trial court's finding, but it is unclear whether
his motive is to show that he was a caretaker for the children during the
marriage, or just to register his offense at being called a babysitter. Regardless, the trial court's finding was backed by the trial court's subsidiary findings that he does not challenge- namely, that Mother made arrangements for the children's breakfast before she left for work, came
home at lunch time to see that they were fed, and took care of their baths
and other needs after work, and that Father stayed up late playing a lot
of video games, slept late into the morning, and although he stayed at
home with the children, he rarely did anything to actually address their
needs during that time. 156 Although the trial court indicates that Father
has developed a commitment toward the children since the time of the
temporary order, the trial court's conclusion that the commitment was not
there before the parties separated is not clearly erroneous.
•

The court improperly found that Father's prescription drug use may
have contributed to his lack of interest in caring for the children.

Father objects to this finding on grounds that there is "no medical
evidence to support" it. 157 However, there was a great deal of evidence
that Father was taking large amounts of hydrocodone and other opioid
156. Ruling 12:3-20, 13: 18-13, 14:8-15:4.
157 Br. Father 42.
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pain relievers. 158 Father's dentist, Dr. Kennington, testified that people
who take hydrocodone often become sleepy, dizzy, and nauseated. 159
There does not need to be further evidence to allow the trial court to make
a connection between probable side effects of a medicine to behavior that
was exhibited. The court's finding was not clearly erroneous.
•

The cowt's concerns over Father's income and financial stability were
improper.

The court had every right to be concerned about the continuation of
Father's income from a business that was less than two years old at the
time of trial, as there was no evidence presented at trial as to the revenues or value of the business, the partnership agreement or financial arrangements between the partners, the nature of Father's responsibilities
with regard to the business, or the identity of Father's business partners.160 Without this evidence, there is no way for the court to determine
whether Father was getting paid from profits or investment money, and if
the latter, how long that reserve of money would last. It was Father's responsibility to put on this evidence.
Father argues that "a mother who remained home with young children would be lauded as a primary caregiver" and implies that the trial

158. Tr.2 37:7-40:1.
159. Tr.2 31:19-32:13.
160. Ruling 7:17- 22, 15:12- 18, 21:18- 22:4, 31:16-21.
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court was applying an improper sex-based double standard. 161 He adds
that the trial court had no rational basis for concern because the evidence
showed "that [Father] could live on his income, due to residing in a fully
paid home for which he owed no rent." 162 However, financial stability is
not about whether parents can live on income, it is about whether parents
can adequately provide for their children. Father has a history of showing
an alarming lack of concern for the financial needs of his family , choosing
to stay home and play video games while his family skids by at less than
150% of the poverty line. 163 In such circumstances, being a stay-at-home
parent, whether a mother or father , is just not practical. Regardless of
whether Father has the house his mother bought him for his rent-free
use, the children still need food, clothing and other necessities, not to
mention what they will need as they grow up , such as band instruments
or sports-team uniforms. Working 5-20 hours a week at a business with
no proven track record does not indicate a recognition of the children's
present and future needs, and the trial court was right to be concerned

161. Br . Father 42.
162. Br. Father 42-43.
163. The poverty line for a family of four in 2009 and 2010 was $22,050.
See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 4199 (Jan.
23, 2009) ; Delayed Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines for the Remainder of 2010, 75 Fed. Reg. 45628 (Aug. 3, 2010). The family's income for 2009
and 2010 was $32,387 and $31,974, respectively. R. at 785.
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that Father's focus on remaining self-employed appeared to take precedence over meeting his family's more immediate needs. 164
Finally, Father argues that Dr. Malovich "attacked [him] for residing in a home purchased by his mother, and for doing so after the report,"
which he claims shows her bias against him. 165 In reality, Dr. Malovich
stated that she thought it was good that the children had more space and
any positive changes made after the custody evaluation that help the
children are commendable, but that she hesitated to give too much weight
to him moving into a new house, as he did not resolve the concern by his
independent efforts to provide for the children, and as there was always a
question about changes subsequent to the custody evaluation as being
done in an effort to influence the final custody result rather than out of
concern for the best interest of the children. 166 These are legitimate concerns, especially given the pattern of Father being unconcerned about
providing for his children's financial needs.
•

The court gave insufficient weight to preserving the custody arrangements made under the temporary orders.

Finally, Father argues that the trial court ignored or discounted the
negative effects that the children would suffer as a result of moving their
primary residence, including changing schools, leaving some friends, and

164. Ruling 21:11-17.
165. Br. Father at 43.
166. Tr.3 86:18-87:21, 159:25-163:13.
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the change in their everyday domestic situation. He cites the testimony of
his expert, Dr. Bursztajn, that as long as the children are doing well
where they are, moving them would constitute an unjustified "social experiment."167 However, the trial court rejected this standard as being contrary to the responsibility of the court to act in the best interests of the
children. 168 Case law similarly rejects placing determinative weight on
continuing the current custody arrangement. As noted by the supreme
court, in deciding custody, the court should consider "the identity of the
primary caretaker during the marriage," as well as "identity of the parent
with whom the child has spent most of his or her time pending custody
determination if that period has been lengthy." 169 In cases such as this
where those are two different people, Dr. Bursztajn's standard would contravene the Utah Supreme Court's direction that a district court should
give the former factor prominent place in its decision calculus. 170 Moreover, the supreme court warned against giving determinative weight to a
custody arrangement based not on evidence and findings , but only on a
temporary orders hearing:
A temporary custody order is only that, temporary. It is effective
only until a fully informed custody determination can be made at a
final hearing. Temporary custody is not to be treated as permanent
custody. Permanent custody is modifiable only upon a threshold
167. Br. Father 43.
168. Ruling 35:11-23.
169. Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1996).
170. Id.
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showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances. If a
temporary order of custody were to be given permanent status subject to Hogge's changed-circumstances test, no party would ever
stipulate to a temporary arrangement and every hearing on temporary custody would involve the time-consuming presentation of
witnesses, both expert and lay, as well as other types of evidence.
In short, a temporary custody hearing would become a permanent
custody hearing.171

In conclusion, IYiother does not deny that Father has, in the words
of the trial court, "made some major changes in his life ... from where he
was three, four, five years ago." 172 The question at trial was whether those
changes would stick after the harsh light of the court proceedings was not
on Father any longer. As Dr. Malovich put it:
If the changes are because Mr. Fullmer is becoming a healthier individual, if it's because he has gained insight, if it's because he has
taken more responsibility for his life and the children and he's ...
functioning better and is able to better meet their needs and be a
more consistent parent figure to them, and is getting healthier in
resolving his issues toward Ms. Fullmer, then that's very positive
and that's very commendable and means something very positive.
If the changes that have been made are a reflection of he and his
family's motivation to prevail in the current custody litigation, it's
not that positive .... I think it's very difficult to make at this point
which is my hesitation, which is why I'm trying to explain why I'm
not saying, oh, that fixes everything .... It may be fixed; it may be
that there's been a really positive change in his whole lifestyle and
approach to life has changed. It's also possible that he's responded
to what amounts to some pretty detailed coaching on how to look

171. Tucker, 910 P.2d at 1215-16.
172. Ruling 21:2-10.

DAY SHELL

& LILJENQUIST, L.C .

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

44

Mar. 21, 2014
Case no . 20130060-CA

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

better for a custody evaluator and how to prevail in Court and I
don't know to what degree each of those factors may be at play. 173

Given this dilemma, the trial court was well within its discretion to
choose to give primary custody to the parent who had been the children's
primary caretaker for the entirety of the children's lives before the temporary order was entered.

Ill.

MOTHER SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY FEES FOR THE NECESSITY
OF DEFENDING AGAINST THIS APPEAL.

Finally, Mother asks for her attorney fees for the necessity of filing
this brief under Rule 24(k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule
24(k) requires a brief to be "concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters." If a party submits a brief that is not in
compliance with this requirement, the Court may impose sanctions on the
offending party, including an award of attorney fees. 174 Bacause failing to
adhere to the briefing requirements "increases the costs of litigation for
both parties and unduly burdens the judiciary's time and energy," 175 an
award of attorney fees is justified to help compensate the innocent party.
This Court has also noted that while sanctions for frivolous appeals

173. Tr.3 161:6-162:12.
174. Utah R. App. P. 24(k).
175. In re Estate of Pahl, 2007 UT App 389,
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"should only be applied in egregious cases," the court has a lower threshold for awarding sanctions based on Rule 24(k). 176
Earlier in this brief, Mother has already explained that an assignment of error for failure to recuse is not reviewable without first filing a
motion and affidavit under Rule 63(b). She has pointed out Father's failure to marshal the evidence. She has noted the lack of organization and
systematic analysis in the argument section of Father's brief. In other
submissions to the Court, Mother has also pointed out the sloppy and deficient nature of Father's docketing statement, 177 conveyed her concern
that Father had filed this appeal for the primary purpose of extracting
concessions from her after final judgment, 178 and noted that Father substantially delayed the filing of his brief, flouting the Court's warnings and
directions with respect to timeliness. 179 Finally, Mother notes the utter
lack of merit to Father's grounds for appeal-this is simply an appeal that
should not have been brought.
Some, or perhaps even all of these factors could be excused if Father
were acting pro se or on the advice of an attorney inexperienced in the
rules and practices of this Court. However, Father has no such excusebased on a quick search through the case law, it appears that Father's

176. Id. at

ii 16.

177. Response to Appellant's Motion To Refer at 2- 4 (filed Feb. 11, 2013).
178. Id . at 4---5.
179. Motion To Strike Lodged Brief at 5 (filed Jan. 7, 2014).
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appellate counsel has appeared before this Court over 40 times, and before the Utah Supreme Court more than ten times. All of these factors together merit a sanction of attorney fees from this Court.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mother respectfully requests this court to
affirm the trial court's decision in this matter and to award Mother her
reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of March, 2014.

/S/ J.Ed Christiansen
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Associated Clinical & Counseling Psychologists
5691 South Redwood Road, Suite 15 Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Telephone: (801) 281-4084 FAX: (801) 281-4083

April 19, 2012
Jeremy Atwood, Esq.
Jeremy Atwood Law, LLC
2668 Grant Ave., Ste. I 04
Ogden, Utah 8440 I

RE: Fullmer v. Fullmer

Case No. 104701561

Dear Mr. Atwood:
The enclosed records are being provided in response to your recent Subpoena
Duces Tecum in the matter of Fullmer v. Fullmer. Per my initial Procedures Agreement,
I have not included material regarding my interactions with the minor children in order to
maintain their privacy, as well as to avoid any potential input by either party about their
conversations with me.
In addition, according to ethical guidelines of the American Psychological
Association, psychological test data can only be released to a professional qualified to
interpret it.

Sincerely,

:IP~M
Natalie J. Malovich, Ph.D.
Licensed Psychologist

cc:

Deborah A. Snow, Esq.
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